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COMMENT
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR TORTS
COMMITTED BY VOLUNTEER
ANTICRIME GROUPS
I. Introduction
Volunteer anticrime activity' has increased markedly over the last
few years. 2 This increase reflects the fiscal problems plaguing many
cities, 3 where diminished financial resources have eroded police forces
through a combination of layoffs, attrition and hiring freezes. 4  One
1. Volunteer anticrime activity takes a variety of forms. Mobile patrols which
employ citizens' band equipped cars, as well as other neighborhood patrols, limit
their involvement to observing and reporting suspicious activity and therefore avoid
direct entanglement with suspected criminals. Shaman, Neighborhood Security Pa-
trols Double, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1982, § 8 (Real Estate), at 1. See also N.Y. Times,
Feb. 25, 1982, at B12, col. 1. Although participation in these programs has increased
recently, this Comment focuses on street and subway patrols. Due to the patrol
members' direct involvement with suspected criminals, the potential for tort liability
is greater than that of the groups which avoid direct confrontation. See notes 13-16
infra. In addition, this Comment examines organized volunteer groups who emulate
municipal police functions. It does not discuss liability in connection with individual
"Good Samaritans." See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6527(2) (McKinney 1972) (provid-
ing immunity for physician rendering emergency treatment outside hospital); W.
PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (4th ed. 1971) (discussing liability for
acts and omissions).
2. In New York City, such activity has doubled over the last four years. Shaman,
supra note 1, at 1. "[A]bout 150,000 [New York] residents are now involved in some
form of crime prevention program .. " Id. Another report estimates that hundreds
of anticrime patrols operate nationally. Pick, Do Good Watchdogs Make Good
Neighbors?, 10 STUDENT LAW. 22, 24 (Dec. 1981).
3. A publication by a New York citizen's group states: "[t]he city's fiscal crisis has
heightened the potential for crime as the number of police officers has been reduced
and many municipal services have been curtailed." Citizen's Committee for New
York City, Inc., "Lend a Hand for a Safer New York" 3 (1980).
4. NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT WORK FORCE
Year No. of Uniformed Policemen No. of Civilian Personnel
1970 31,680 2,138
1972 30,464 2,330
1974 31,632 4,341
1976 26,632 4,307
1978 24,729 4,406
1980 22,902 4,449
Chart compiled from information furnished by Office of Management and Analysis,
New York City Police Department (Feb. 26, 1982) (unpublished data). "Layoffs" of
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volunteer anticrime group in particular, the Alliance of Guardian
Angels, Inc. (Guardian Angels), has achieved considerable notoriety
for its patrols of New York City subways. Its members, originally
thirteen in number, began patrolling the subways in February,
1979.5 By October, 1980, the Guardian Angels boasted 550 mem-
bers, and New York City had offered to make them auxiliaries of the
New York City transit police.6 The director of the group rejected the
offer, fearing undue governmental influence in its operations. 7 Three
months later, however, the New York City police department and the
Guardian Angels formulated a plan under which the now 700 mem-
bers could retain their independent status,8 yet benefit from a struc-
tured "ongoing relationship" with the city police.9 This plan culmi-
nated in a "Memorandum of Understanding" reached between the
City of New York and the Guardian Angels in March, 1981.10
In contrast to the relatively passive stance adopted by some volun-
teer anticrime groups, 1 the Guardian Angels deter crime by exercis-
ing the statutory power to effect citizen's arrest.' 2 In jurisdictions like
New York, where the Guardian Angels are active, an individual in
fact must have committed a crime for the citizen's arrest to be lawful.
Where an arrest is found to be unlawful, the arrestor may be liable
uniformed police commenced in July 1975. At the same time, hiring of civilian
personnel, defined in this chart to include clerical police department employees and
to exclude school crossing guards and employees working under grants, increased to
allow the maximum number of uniformed police to perform their patrol duties. As of
December 1981, uniformed personnel numbered 22,006, and civilian personnel,
5,576. Information supplied by Office of Management and Analysis (Feb. 26, 1982).
5. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1981, at B5, col. 1.
6. Id. Oct. 17, 1980, at B3, col. 5. See notes 246-65 infra and accompanying
text for a discussion of the legal status of auxiliary police.
7. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1980, at B3, col. 5. " 'We feel we can be more effective
if we don't become involved with the Transit Authority.' "Id., quoting Curtis Sliwa,
head of the Guardian Angels.
8. Id., Jan. 15, 1981, at B5, col. 2.
9. City of New York, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, March 25, 1981 [here-
inafter cited as MEMORANDUM]; New York City Police Department, Operations Order
No. 45, The Alliance of Guardian Angels, Inc., May 29, 1981. This Operations Order
was issued pursuant to the Memorandum.
10. MEMORANDUM, supra note 9.
11. See note 1 supra.
12. MEMORANDUM, supra note 9, 10. The citizen's power to arrest, a right
formerly enjoyed at common law, largely has been superseded by statute. See The
Law of Citizen's Arrest, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 502, 503, 511 (1965); Lurie v. District
Attorney, 56 Misc. 2d 68, 72, 288 N.Y.S.2d 256, 263 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968)
("[c]learly the new arrest statute pre-empted the field to the exclusion of all such
common-law rights").
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civilly for damages. 13 In view of the strict standards governing the
propriety of citizen's arrests, 14 suits for false arrest against anticrime
volunteers such as the Guardian Angels may be brought.' 5 In addi-
tion, any physical injuries caused by anticrime volunteers could lead
to suits to recover for excessive force.' 6
A party injured by an anticrime volunteer bears a strong incentive
to hold a municipality liable' 7 for injuries inflicted by individuals
whose functions of patrol and arrest closely resemble those of the
police.' Such a plaintiff may proceed under the following three
13. In New York, the right of citizen's arrest is codified in § 140.30 of the
Criminal Procedure Law, which provides: any person may arrest another person (a)
for a felony when the latter has in fact committed such felony, and (b) for any offense
when the latter has in fact committed such offense in his presence. N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 140.30(1) (McKinney 1981). The statutes in other jurisdictions, too, generally
are strict, retaining the common law standards. See The Law of Citizen's Arrest,
supra note 12, at 511. See generally 6A C.J.S. Arrest §§ 10, 12-15 (1975); 5 Am. Jur.
2d Arrest § 23 (1962). Under New York's provision, "[i]f the offense was not in fact
committed, a person may be liable civilly and answerable in damages, even if acting
in good faith upon reasonable cause." N.Y. CraM. PROC. LAW § 140.30 (McKinney
1981) (Practice Commentary).
14. See note 13 supra.
15. By December, 1981, the Guardian Angels arrested 150 persons under their
statutory power to effect citizen's arrest. Pick, supra note 2, at 42.
16. The amount of force allowed to effect the arrest is similarly regulated by
statute. New York's codification provides:
A private person acting on his own account may use physical force, other
than deadly physical force, upon another person when and to the extent
that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to effect an arrest or to
prevent the escape from custody of a person whom he reasonably believes
to have committed an offense and who in fact has committed such offense.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30(4) (McKinney 1975) (emphasis added). "In brief, the 'pri-
vate person' arrester, in order to be justified in using any physical force to make any
arrest, must not only believe that the arrestee has committed the offense in question,
but he must be right .... " Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (Practice Com-
mentary to subdivision 4).
17. Reasons frequently mentioned include: (1) ensuring a financially responsible
defendant; (2) enhancing jury sympathy; and (3) obviating the need to identify the
tortious actor out of a group. See Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349, 355 n.11 (8th Cir.
1980); Dean v. Gladney, 621 F.2d 1331, 1337 n.15 (5th Cir. 1980) cert. denied sub
nom. Dean v. County of Brazoria, 450 U.S. 983 (1981); Respondeat Superior Liabil-
ity of Municipalities for Constitutional Torts after Monell: New Remedies to Pursue?,
44 Mo. L. REV. 514, 536 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Respondeat Superior Liability];
Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89
HARv. L. REV. 922, 923, 926-27 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Damage Remedies]. The
doctrine of governmental immunity has been eroded in recent years. See note 224
infra and accompanying text.
18. Although a municipality may be liable for the conduct of its police officers, it
generally will not be liable for failure to provide police protection or "adequate
protection" to members of the public. Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 583,
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causes of action: first, a tort claim for assault, battery or false arrest
under state law;'9 second, an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (section
1983) ,20 alleging an unconstitutional deprivation under color of state
law, custom or usage; and third, a Bivens-type2' action implied di-
rectly under the fourteenth amendment.
This Comment examines the elements that a plaintiff proceeding
under section 1983, Bivens or state law must prove in order to recover
against a municipality for torts committed by anticrime volunteer
groups. 22 It reviews the agreement reached by the Guardian Angels
and New York City and analyzes the extent to which this municipality
has attempted to avoid tort liability. This Comment concludes that
even if a plaintiff establishes a master-servant relationship, success in
recovering against a municipal corporation may be limited to a state
law tort claim. The Supreme Court's rejection of respondeat supe-
rior23 as a basis for municipal liability in section 1983 claims 24 and
judicial hesitation in implying causes of action directly under the
Constitution 25 effectively prevent an injured party from succeeding
under either of those theories. A plaintiff proceeding under state law
240 N.E.2d 860, 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 898 (1968); Bass v. City of New York, 38
A.D.2d 407, 413-14, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569, 576 (2d Dep't (1972); 18 MCQUILLIN, THE LAW
OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.79-.86 (rev. 3d ed. 1977). Failure to provide protec-
tion or "adequate" protection may be actionable, however, where a special duty of
protection is owed to an individual. See Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154
N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958) (special duty to protect informer who furnished
information to police leading to apprehension of a dangerous fugitive). A plaintiff
recently sued New York City for injuries caused by Guardian Angels, alleging inter alia,
that the city was negligent in failing to provide adequate police protection. The court
rejected this argument on the basis of Bass and Schuster. Adames v. City of New York,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 26, 1982, at 5, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Apr. 13, 1982).
19. See notes 221-65 infra and accompanying text.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
21. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See text accompa-
nying notes 163-220 infra.
22. This Comment focuses on municipal liability for the torts of volunteer anti-
crime patrols. The liability of individual members will be examined only inciden-
tally. See text accompanying notes 88-129 infra.
23. See notes 34, 228-45 infra and accompanying text.
24. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
25. See text accompanying notes 163-220 infra.
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may employ respondeat superior, but might enjoy greater success by
pointing to the similarity in functions between the Guardian Angels
and the New York City auxiliary police to find municipal liability in
connection with the activities of both groups.
II. Theories of Recovery
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Monel v. Department of
Social Services,26 municipalities have been subject to suit under section
1983, a statute intended to enforce the fourteenth amendment. 27 The
plaintiff proceeding against a municipality under section 198328 must
establish two elements: first, that the deprivation was caused by an
official policy, custom or usage of the municipality,2 9 and second, that
the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 30 Establish-
26. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). "Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities
and other local government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983
applies." Id. at 690. Monell expressly overruled a prior Supreme Court decision,
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), which had held that municipalities were not
"persons" under § 1983. The impact of Monell in this regard has been discussed
extensively. E.g., Peters, Municipal Liability After Owen v. City of Independence
and Maine v. Thiboutet, 13 URB. L. 407 (1981); Seng, Municipal Liability for Police
Misconduct, 51 Miss. L.J. 1 (1980); Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (1979).
27. As Monell noted, Congress intended § 1983 to provide a "broad remedy for
violations of federally protected civil rights." Monell, 436 U.S. at 685 (emphasis
added). "It was one of the means whereby Congress exercised the power vested in it
by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the provisions of that Amendment."
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961) (citations omitted). See also Singleton v.
City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 204 (2d Cir. 1980) (Weinstein, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981) citing Note, Actionability of Negligence Under Section
1983 and The Eighth Amendment, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 537-38 (1978); Cress-
man, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1357
(1952); Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV.
1133, 1153-55 (1977).
28. See note 20 supra for text of § 1983.
29. "[I]t is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by
its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official
policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under §
1983." Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. See also Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 643
(7th Cir. 1981).
30. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
Without considering whether the acts complained of deprived the plaintiffs of a
right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
the Court in Monell passed directly to the question of whether municipalities were
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ing the first element, however, has proved problematic for many
plaintiffs because of the narrow definition courts often give to "official
policy, custom or usage."' 31 Unlike Monell, where the municipality's
unconstitutional policies were embodied in regulations and bylaws,3 2
municipalities often do not express unconstitutional policies in as overt
a manner. 33 In addition, Monell stated that a municipality could not
be held liable under section 1983 on any theory of vicarious liability
including respondeat superior.34 The Supreme Court's holding be-
comes significant in the context of volunteer anticrime patrols because
volunteer status does not necessarily preclude the application of re-
spondeat superior.35
1. Official Policy
Monell expressly recognized that governmental policy, custom or
usage, cognizable under section 1983, could be found even though not
expressly set forth in a statute or law. 3  Subsequent decisions have
inferred such policy from inaction, 37 thereby raising the question
amenable to actions brought pursuant to § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 662-64. The
second element derives directly from the language of § 1983. See note 20 supra.
31. See Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1981); Avery v. County
of Burke, 660 F.2d 111 (4th Cir. 1981); Harbulak v. County of Suffolk, 654 F.2d 194
(2d Cir. 1981); Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736 (1st Cir. 1980); Turpin
v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196 (2d Cir.), cert denied sub nom. City of West Haven v.
Turpin, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980).
32. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 394 F. Supp. 853, 854-55 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aff'd, 532 F.2d 254 (1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monell, the Board of
Education and Department of Social Services compelled pregnant employees to take
medically unnecessary leaves of absence without pay in violation of the due process
clause.
33. E.g., Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981).
34. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Respondeat superior holds a master liable for the
torts of his servant committed in the course of his employment. W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 458 (4th ed. 1971). See notes 228-45 infra and
accompanying text. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958); F.
MECHEM, OUTLINE OF AGENCY § 349 (4th ed. 1952); W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF AGENCY § 83 (1964). Moneil's rejection of respondeat superior as a basis for
municipal liability has been criticized. See Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After
Moneil, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (1979); Respondeat Superior Liabililty, supra note
17, at 514 (1979).
35. See notes 231-35 infra and accompanying text.
36. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
37. See, e.g., Avery v. County of Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1981)
(official policy may be established by omissions); Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d
1220, 1224 (8th Cir. 1981) ("municipality's continuing failure to remedy known
unconstitutional conduct of its police officers is the type of informal policy or custom
that is amenable to suit under § 1983"); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs.,
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whether a municipality's acquiescence in the acts of volunteer anti-
crime groups performing police functions may constitute "official
policy." A finding of official policy, however, would be doubtful
because a plaintiff most likely would attempt to predicate municipal
liability on a single tortious incident.
In Turpin v. Mailet,38 a plaintiff who earlier had succeeded in a
section 1983 suit against a police officer for excessive force in connec-
tion with an arrest, 39 alleged that a second policeman maliciously
arrested him on a charge of disorderly conduct, having been moti-
vated solely by the outcome of the first lawsuit. 40 The plaintiff sought
to hold the city liable, claiming that the failure of the police depart-
ment to discipline the first policeman encouraged other officers "to
believe. . . that they could violate [his] rights with impunity. ' 41 The
court examined whether the municipality's inaction in the face of
unconstitutional police behavior could evidence an "official policy"
within the meaning of Monell.42  Noting that the allegations con-
cerned not one, but two unlawful arrests, the court nevertheless con-
cluded that the plaintiff failed to prove any official policy. 43
Turpin stated that official policy could be inferred from both the
acts and omissions of a municipality's supervisory officials. 44  The
649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1981) (officials may be liable under § 1983 for failure to
do what is required as well as for overt activity); Shinman v. Frank, 633 F.2d 468,
469 (6th Cir. 1980) (inaction can lead to civil rights liability); Turpin v. Mailet, 619
F.2d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 1980) (official policy may be inferred from supervisory
officials' omissions). Many of these decisions relied on Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976), where the Court recognized that "deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs" of a prisoner could violate the eighth amendment. Id. at 104. The Court ruled,
however, that the facts indicated that most medical malpractice which was not cogni-
zable under § 1983. Id. at 107.
38. 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.) (en banc), vacated sub nom. City of West Haven v.
Turpin, 439 U.S. 974 (1978), modified on remand, 591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979) (en
banc).
39. The plaintiff alleged that a policeman severely wounded him when he at-
tempted to intervene in the arrest of another person. Although the police arrested
and prosecuted the plaintiff, the juvenile court declined to convict him. Id. at 154
(citing unreported lower court decision).
40. Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom.
City of West Haven v. Turpin, 449 U.S. 1016 (1981).
41. Turpin, 619 F.2d at 198.
42. Id. at 197.
43. Id. at 202. While the failure to discipline the first officer "might suggest a
slight disregard for [the plaintiff's] rights," id. at 203, it did not amount to "official
policy" sufficient to find municipal liability under § 1983. Id. at 203-04.
44. Id. at 201.
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court observed, however, that "absent more evidence of supervisory
indifference, such as acquiescence in a prior pattern of conduct, a
policy could not ordinarily be inferred from a single incident of ille-
gality such as a first arrest without probable cause or with excessive
use of force."' 45 Other courts have reached similar results. 4 Indeed,
as one court explained, imposition of liability in such an instance
would amount to an invocation of respondeat superior contrary to
Monell. 47
Despite the trend of decisions rejecting municipal liability for inac-
tion following an isolated incident, the court in Herrera v. Valentine
found liability for inaction in the face of egregious police miscon-
duct.4 8  In Herrera, an officer kicked a visibly pregnant plaintiff in
the abdomen and threw her to the ground. He refused her requests for
medical attention and later threatened to shoot her. 49  Moreover,
while she was in his custody, he denied her requests for legal counsel.
The plaintiff complained that she suffered physical and emotional
injuries and delivered her child stillborn as a result of the beating.5 0
Alleging violations of her civil rights under section 1983, the plaintiff
named the officer and the municipality as defendants, and theorized
that the city's failure to "properly hire, train, retain, supervise, disci-
pline and control [its police] directly caused her tortious injury."51
The court noted that "a municipality's continuing failure to remedy
known unconstitutional conduct of its police officers is the type of
informal policy or custom that is amenable to suit under section
1983,"52 and concluded that the evidence of prior official knowledge
45. Id. at 202.
46. Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 650 (7th Cir. 1981) (allegation of
single act will not support finding of official policy, but pattern or series of incidents
could lead to finding of official policy); Avery v. County of Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 114
(4th Cir. 1981) (single or isolated incidents normally insufficient to establish §1983
liability); Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 195 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing
Turpin, the court held that official policy was not to be inferred from single unlawful
incident absent additional circumstances); Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d
736, 747 (lst. Cir. 1980) (alleged treatment was an isolated incident; failure to
investigate not sufficient to establish liability).
47. Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 650 (7th Cir. 1981), citing Sterling v.
Village of Maywood, 579 F.2d 1350 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913
(1979).
48. 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981).
49. Id. at 1222.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1224.
52. Id.
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of police misconduct 53 amply supported the judgment against the
city.54
Herrera illustrates that inaction may lead to an inference of official
policy where it follows a series of unlawful episodes. A plaintiff also
may establish "policy" by pointing to an official "whose edicts or acts
may fairly be said to represent official policy ........ 5 In Black v.
Stephens,-" a detective arrested a husband and wife following an
altercation at a traffic light and charged the husband with aggravated
assault.5 7 Two days later the husband complained about the detec-
tive to the police chief but was informed that, due to an official
regulation, the department would conduct no investigation until the
charges pending against the husband were resolved.5 8 Upon learning
of the complaint, the detective filed three additional charges against
the husband based on the original altercation.59 The husband and
wife, as plaintiffs, commenced an action against the individual detec-
tive, the chief of police, and the municipality under section 1983.60
The court stated that to hold the police chief liable under section
1983, the plaintiff had to "establish a causal connection between the
police chief's actions and the officer's unconstitutional activity"," and
found that the timing of the additional charges supplied the necessary
connection.6 2 In addition, the court noted that three factors in the
actions of the police chief pointed to an official policy: the chief had
promulgated the regulation which postponed disciplinary hearings
53. The court found that numerous complaints of police misconduct had been
made previously to the authorities, including charges of excessive force, sexual mis-
conduct, racism and selective law enforcement. Id. at 1225. Hearings and investiga-
tions by county and independent agencies all concluded that a pervasive problem
with the conduct of the city police force existed. The mayor, city council, and the
Nebraska Indian Commission all previously had been aware of the numerous com-
plaints. Id.
54. Id. A judgment against the individual officers also was upheld. Id.
55. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
56. 662 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3710 (U.S. Mar. 9,
1982) (No. 81-1239).
57. Id. at 186.
58. id.
59. Id.
60. Finding that excessive force had been applied, that a regulation promulgated
by the chief caused the filing of unwarranted charges, and that the chief had a policy
of encouraging the use of excessive force by officers, a jury awarded compensatory
damages against the detective and compensatory and punitive damages against the
chief and the city. Id. at 187.
61. Id. at 189.
62. Id. at 190.
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until the underlying arrest was resolved; 3 "a citizen's complaint about
excessive force never went into a police officer's permanent personnel
file;"'6 4 and "he never initiated a disciplinary action against an officer
based solely on his evaluation of the officer's use of force." '65  Reject-
ing the municipality's contention that, contrary to Monell, its liability
was predicated on respondeat superior, the court held that Monell
was satisfied because the police chief represented official policy for the
city.66
2. Constitutional Deprivation
The plaintiff who successfully establishes that an anticrime volun-
teer was acting pursuant to official policy also must establish that the
conduct amounted to a constitutional deprivation-not a mere viola-
tion of state tort law.6 7  In Baker v. McCollan,6s a plaintiff sued
under section 1983, 6 alleging that a state sheriff mistakenly arrested
him and detained him for four days70 without due process of law. The
Supreme Court observed that "false imprisonment does not become a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because the defendant
63. Id. at 189.
64. Id. at 190.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 191, quoting Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978).
67. " 'The ... inquiry in any § 1983 suit . .. is whether the plaintiff has been
deprived of a right 'secured by the Constitution and laws'. . . . Section 1983 imposes
liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of
duties of care arising out of tort law.' " Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265
(5th Cir. 1981), quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 138, 146 (1979). Accord
Roberts v. Marino, 656 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1981); Braden v. Texas A & M Univ.
Sys., 636 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1981) (breach of contract action); Shillingford v. Holmes,
634 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1981); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980); Johnson
v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414 U.S.
1033 (1973).
68. 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
69. Without stating its reasons, the district court directed a verdict in favor of the
sheriff and his surety. Baker, 443 U.S. at 141. The court of appeals, characterizing
respondent's cause of action as a § 1983 false imprisonment claim, reversed the
decision. McCollan v. Tate, 575 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1978). It held that the plaintiff
was entitled to have his § 1983 claim presented to the jury, although the evidence
supported no more than a finding of negligence on the sheriff's part. Id. at 512.
70. In Baker, the plaintiff's brother was arrested on narcotics charges and,
because he carried a driver's license with the plaintiff's name, was booked mistakenly
under that name. He was released on bond, and subsequently, an arrest warrant was
issued for him in the plaintiff's name. Pursuant to the warrant and over his protest,
the plaintiff was taken into custody and held for four days before the error finally
was discovered and he was released. Baker, 443 U.S. at 137.
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is a state official."' 7' It distinguished rights protected by the constitu-
tion from those arising out of tort law, ruling that violations of the
latter must be redressed in state courts under traditional tort law
principles .7 2
Baker establishes a threshold requirement: to proceed under section
1983, the plaintiff must have been deprived of a right " 'secured by
the Constitution and laws.' "-73 While the distinction seems to be
elementary, the decisions following Baker reveal that courts have had
to make the determination on a case-by-case basis. 4 One Second
Circuit opinion, Johnson v. Glick,75 decided before Baker, has proved
to be helpful in determining whether a given set of facts presents a
common law tort or a constitutional violation. Johnson directs inquiry
into "[1] the need for application of force, [2] the relation between the
need and the amount of force that was used, [3] the extent of the
injury inflicted, and [4] whether force was applied in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically
for the very purpose of causing harm."176 In Shillingford v. Holmes,77
71. Id. at 146.
72. Id. Justice Stevens' dissent in Baker (joined by Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall) did not take issue with the majority's distinction between violations actionable
only under state law and those actionable under the Constitution. The dissent,
however, found that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's
arrest and detention amounted to a violation of his fourteenth amendment rights.
Baker, 443 U.S. at 149-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 140, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
74. See, e.g. Roberts v. Marino, 656 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1981); Shillingford v.
Holmes, 634 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1981); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1980).
75. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414 U.S.
1033 (1973).
76. Id. at 1029-30. In Johnson, a prisoner alleged that a guard made an unpro-
voked attack on him and placed him in a holding cell for two hours before permitting
him medical attention. Id. Noting that "[n]ot every push or shove ... violates a
prisoner's constitutional rights," id. at 1033, the court cited the Supreme Court's
language in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), which noted that pumping a
suspect's stomach to determine whether he had swallowed illegal narcotics was
" 'conduct that shocked the conscience' " and violated due process. Johnson, 481
F.2d at 1033, quoting Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172. Johnson's factors, therefore, arose in
an attempt to implement the Supreme Court's standards of due process in a meaning-
ful fashion, and along with Baker, have been followed essentially without modifica-
tion. E.g., Roberts v. Marino, 656 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1981); Shillingford v. Holmes,
634 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1981).
Johnson's "good faith" factor regarding the motivation for the application of force
remains viable despite Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, (1980). Owen
removed the good faith of officers as a defense to municipal liability under § 1983.
Johnson employed the good faith test not as a defense to liability as in Owen, but
merely as one element a court should consider in weighing the totality of the circum-
stances surrounding the application of force. Compare language in Johnson, see text
accompanying this note, with Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265-66 (5th Cir.
1981).
77. 634 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1981).
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for example, a bystander tourist alleged that a policeman attacked
him when he merely was photographing a group of policemen appre-
hending a boy.7 8  Beginning with the proposition that section 1983
"[was] not a general tort statute, '7 9 the court noted that Baker "per-
mit[ted] no bright line to be drawn"80 in determining whether an
injury amounted to a constitutional deprivation. Applying the John-
son factors, however, the court found that the physical abuse inflicted
"[on] a bystander on the public streets ... [was] sufficiently severe,
sufficiently disproportionate to the need presented and so deliberate
and unjustified" 81 as to amount to a deprivation of constitutional
rights.8 2
3. Municipal Liability Through Concerted Action or Negligence.
Monell establishes that municipalities will be liable under section
1983 only where official policy or custom subjects a plaintiff to a
constitutional deprivation.8 3 Where volunteer anticrime patrols are
involved, it is likely that any episode giving rise to a cause of action
will be a single, isolated incident. In addition, Turpin8 4 and numerous
decisions85 indicate that official inaction following an isolated inci-
dent will not permit an inference of policy sufficient to support mu-
nicipal liability under section 1983. Thus, if a plaintiff shows official
inaction following an isolated incident of excessive force or unlawful
imprisonment, effected by either a volunteer actor or a regular police
officer, the weight of authority suggests he will be unsuccessful in
establishing that official policy led to the violation. Where, however,
he can demonstrate inaction in the face of a pattern of misconduct, as
in Herrera, 8 or implementation of procedures leading to misconduct,
as in Black,87 the likelihood of establishing "official policy" is much
greater.
78. Id. at 264.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 265.
81. Id. at 266. See also Roberts v. Marino, 656 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1981), where
the court employed a similar balancing approach.
82. Shillingford, 634 F.2d at 266.
83. 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). See notes 36-66 supra and accompanying text.
84. 619 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1980).
85. See note 46 supra.
86. 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981).
87. 662 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1981).
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a. Shopkeeper's and Citizen's Arrest Decisions
The issue of individual liability is distinct from the issue of munici-
pal liability under section 1983. The statute reflects a congressional
attempt to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment8
which regulates state action.8 9 Thus, to find individual liability un-
der section 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the conduct com-
plained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law
and that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege or
immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 90
Courts occasionally have found liability for individuals acting in con-
cert with police officers under a prearranged plan-especially in the
face of a statute authorizing merchants' detention of suspected shop-
lifters.91 Although these decisions involve individual liability under
section 1983, this concerted action potentially could amount to "offi-
cial policy" sufficient to support municipal liability under Monell.
These decisions 92 suggest the extent to which a court may allow
recovery against anticrime groups under section 1983 because these
volunteers effect citizen's arrests authorized by state statutes.93 The
Supreme Court in Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks9 4 set forth two elements
88. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961). It firmly is established "that the
action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action
as may fairly be said to be that of the States." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13
(1948).
89. "[P]rivate conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful," will not be action-
able under the Constitution. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13.
90. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
91. Duriso v. K-Mart No. 4195, 559 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Brook-
shire Bros., Inc., 519 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915
(1976). See also El Fundi v. Deroche, 625 F.2d 195, 196 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
92. White v. Scrivner, 594 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1979) (shopkeeper's arrest); Smith
v. Brookshire Bros., Inc., 519 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 915 (1976) (shopkeeper's arrest); Warren v. Cummings, 303 F. Supp. 803 (D.
Colo. 1969) (citizen's arrest).
93. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
94. 436 U.S. 149 (1978). In Flagg Bros., a warehouseman proposed to sell
plaintiffs' goods which were stored with him pursuant to a New York statute autho-
rizing the sale to enforce a lien. The plaintiffs sued under § 1983 to enjoin the sale,
alleging it violated the fourteenth amendment by depriving them of property without
due process of law. To satisfy the "color of law " requirement, the plaintiffs advanced
two arguments. First, they claimed that the statutory power to resolve private
disputes was one exclusively reserved to the state, which had only been delegated to
the warehouseman. Id. at 157. Second, they argued that the proposed sale was
properly attributable to the state "because the State has authorized and encouraged it
in enacting ... [the statute]." Id. at 164. The Court rejected both contentions; only
where the statute delegates an "exclusive prerogative of the sovereign," id. at 160, as
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indicating when private action pursuant to a state statute amounts to
state action: when the statute delegates an "exclusive prerogative of
the sovereign," 95 and when " 'the State, by its law, has compelled the
act.' "96
In Smith v. Brookshire Bros., Inc.,9 the court distinguished in-
stances cognizable under section 1983 from those actionable only
under state tort law where defendants were individuals acting under a
shopkeeper's statute.98 The store officials in Smith "knew that they
could have people detained merely by calling the police and designat-
ing the detainee." 99  The police, in turn, arrested suspects without
independently establishing that there was probable cause that shop-
lifting had occurred. 00 The court held that the actions of the store
employees and the police were concerted and, therefore, amounted to
state action. 101
By contrast, in White v. Scrivner Corp.,'02 the court did not find
state action pursuant to shopkeeper's statutes. In White, employees of
a store detained and searched individuals suspected of shoplifting.
Although the defendants found no store merchandise in the possession
of the plaintiffs, only a handgun, they nevertheless summoned the
police, 103 who arrested one of the plaintiffs for carrying a concealed
for example in elections of public officials, would the Court find state action. Noting
that several remedies were available to debtors and creditors, id. at 162, the Court
rejected the claim that the lien enforcement statute delegated an exclusive state
function. Id. at 161. Turning to the plaintiffs' second argument, the Court ruled
" 'that a State is responsible for the ... act of a private party when the State, by its
law, has compelled the act.' " Id. at 164, quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. at 170. "[A] State's mere acquiescence in a private action [would not] convert
... that action into that of the State." Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164. New York State
had permitted sales of property to enforce liens, but it did not compel such sales. Id.
at 165.
95. Id. at 160.
96. Id. at 164, citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970).
97. 519 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976).
98. Id. at 94.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 95. Similarly, in Duriso v. K-Mart No. 4195, 559 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir.
1977) (per curiam), the plaintiff was detained as a suspected shoplifter. The police
were summoned, the plaintiff searched, and although no weapons or merchandise
were found, he was arrested. Relying on Smith v. Brookshire Bros., Inc., the court
stated, "a detention by store employees is under color of state law if it is demon-
strated that the store employees and the police were acting in concert and that the
store and the police had a customary plan which resulted in the detention." Id. at
1277. The court held that the jury could have found a "customary plan." Id. at 1278.
102. 594 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1979).
103. Id. at 141.
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weapon. 10 4 Alleging that the search and detention violated their
rights under the fourteenth amendment, the plaintiffs brought an
action under section 1983 against the store and the employees. They
offered three arguments to satisfy the color of law requirement: first,
that in detaining and searching them, the employees performed a
function exclusively reserved to the state;10 5 second, that defendants
acted pursuant to a state statute permitting detention of suspected
shoplifters; 06 and, finally, that the defendants acted in concert with
the police.10 7 The court rejected the first two arguments on the basis
of Flagg Bros. "0s It reasoned that neither the storekeeper's detention
of suspected shoplifters, 109 nor the detention following the discovery of
a gun," 0 were functions exclusively reserved to the state. Although
police usually performed these acts,"' private citizens also engaged in
such activity. Moreover, the statutes permitted, but did not compel,
the detention of shoplifters." 2 The third contention, that action in
concert with the police amounted to state action, also failed."13 Dis-
tinguishing Smith, where police "routinely arrested suspected shop-
lifters solely upon the statement of the storekeeper" without either an
independent investigation or sworn complaint," 4 the White court
found that the evidence did not reveal a plan between the police and
the defendant employees. "1
Finally, courts make distinctions between the types of arrest stat-
utes involved in determining whether state action exists; a plaintiff's
success, therefore, may hinge on whether a citizen's or a shopkeeper's
arrest statute is involved. In Warren v. Cummings, " the proprietor
of a liquor store, his employee, and a third man who identified
himself as being either a detective or a probation officer confined and
detained a suspected shoplifter until he was removed by local police-
men."17 Alleging a section 1983 deprivation of his right to be free
from unlawful arrest, the plaintiff contended that the state statutes
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See note 94 supra.
109. White, 594 F.2d at 142.
110. Id. at 143.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 143-44.
114. See notes 97-101 supra and accompanying text.
115. White, 594 F.2d at 143.
116. 303 F. Supp. 803 (D. Colo. 1969).
117. Id. at 804.
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which permitted a private citizen to effect an arrest" 8 and a store-
keeper to question suspected shoplifters 1I 9 "vested defendants with the
authority to act as agents of the state . . . under color of state
law." 2 0 The court rejected this argument as to all three defendants,
but made distinctions between the merchant and his employee, on the
one hand, and the private citizen, on the other. First, it observed that
the shopkeeper's statutes licensed a merchant to detain and question
suspected shoplifters, but it did not vest him with the authority of the
state ' 2 because "[tihe actions of [the proprietor and his employee]
were in pursuit of their own personal interest even under [the stat-
utes]." 1 22 As for the third defendant, the court commented that the
state arguably was sharing its sovereignty 123 by allowing a private
citizen to arrest suspected criminals. The court nonetheless decided
that the private arrest did not amount to state action. Distinguishing
shopkeeper's statutes as purely creatures of the legislature, 124 Warren
reasoned that statutes permitting citizen's arrests merely codified pre-
existing common law rights; they neither added to the common law
right nor encouraged the arrest. This common law right, therefore,
did not amount to such significant state action as to make the defend-
ant an agent of the state.12 5
The shopkeeper's and citizen's arrest decisions suggest the type of
situations where individual liability may be found under section 1983;
they are not, however, in accord. 26  Given the types of volunteer
activity likely to lead to a cause of action, namely, unlawful arrest or
118. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-2-20 (1963), presently codified at COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 16-3-201 (1973).
119. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 40-5-31 (1963), presently codified at COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-4-407 (1973).
120. Warren, 303 F. Supp. at 805. See also Weyandt v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 279
F. Supp. 283 (W.D. Pa. 1968); Van Daele v. Vince, 294 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
121. Warren, 303 F. Supp. at 805.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 806.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Mendoza v. K-Mart, Inc., 587 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1978) (no plan found;
shoplifting statute not sufficient for finding state action); Warren v. Cummings, 303
F. Supp. 803 (D. Colo. 1969) (no state action, no plan). But see El Fundi v. Deroche,
625 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (reversing summary dismissal of § 1983
claim, court held "state action is present when private security guards act in concert
with police officers or pursuant to customary procedures agreed to by police depart-
ments, particularly when a state statute authorizes merchants to detain suspected
shoplifters," id. at 196); Duriso v. K-Mart No. 4195, 559 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977)
(affirming finding of state action through customary plan between store and police
regarding suspected shoplifter); Smith v. Brookshire Bros., Inc., 519 F.2d 93 (5th
Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976) (state action found
through concerted action of store managers and police pursuant to customary plan).
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use of excessive force, it is questionable in light of these decisions
whether the individual volunteers would be held liable under section
1983. By analogy to the shopkeeper's cases, 127 however, if concerted
action were found between the police and the volunteer group acting
pursuant to citizen's arrest statutes, it is possible that a court could
find official policy, and hence municipal liability. Notably, the Mem-
orandum of Understanding reached between the Guardian Angels
and the City of New York 128 does not contemplate a prearranged
course of action. The police officer is directed to cooperate with the
volunteer but is instructed to follow ordinary procedures and to "com-
ply with all departmental procedures established for an arrest by a
civilian." 129
b. Municipal Negligence
A plaintiff injured by a volunteer anticrime group also may seek to
hold the municipality liable on a negligence theory, alleging that the
municipality's negligent failure to train, supervise or control the vol-
unteers caused the constitutional deprivation. 30  Such a theory does
not violate Monell's bar against vicarious liability because the plaintiff
still must show that a municipality's official policy caused the in-
jury. 131 The negligence theory, frequently invoked in cases involving
police misconduct, 132 arises from the Supreme Court's decision in
Monroe v. Pape,133 where the court stated that the section "should be
read against the background of tort liability that makes a man respon-
127. See notes 97-126 supra and accompanying text.
128. See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra and 236-45 infra.
129. MEMORANDUM, supra note 9, 10; New York City Police Department
Operations Order No. 45, The Alliance of Guardian Angels, Inc., May 29, 1981, 5.
See note 239 infra and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir 1982);
Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Edmonds v. Dillin, 485 F.
Supp. 722, 725-26 (N.D.Ohio 1980); Leite v. City of Providence, 463 F. Supp. 585,
588 (D.R.I. 1978); Schweiker v. Gordon, 442 F. Supp. 1134, 1136 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
131. Leite v. City of Providence, 463 F. Supp. 585 (D.R.I. 1978).
Although [plaintiff's] complaint is largely phrased in terms of a respondeat
superior claim, he does assert that "the City of Providence is liable ... in
that it was negligent in hiring, training, continuing to employ and/or
failing to discipline and/or supervise its employees .... " Such a claim
asserts that official municipal policy was one of the direct causes of the
alleged harm. Therefore, the City ... is not being sued solely on the basis
of a respondeat superior theory.
Id. at 588.
132. See cases cited at note 130 supra.
133. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Monroe has been overruled in part, see note 26 supra,
to the extent that it held local governments were completely immune from suit under
§ 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 663.
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sible for the natural consequences of his actions." 134 Three factors,
however, may prevent a negligence theory from succeeding. First,
although the general similarity of patrol and arrest functions seems to
suggest the applicability of the theory, it is questionable whether a
municipality should be held liable for failing to control a group that,
by its nature, remains essentially beyond the exercise of any real
control. 135 Second, given the favorable record enjoyed by groups like
the Guardian Angels, 136 it is unlikely that a plaintiff could establish
the breach of a duty regarding their control or supervision. Finally,
even if the negligence theory could be applied to a municipality in the
context of a claim stemming from the actions of volunteers, a question
remains whether mere negligence will support municipal liability
under section 1983. The trend of case law indicates that it may not.1 37
Despite the weight of authority rejecting this approach, plaintiffs
still assert the negligence theory in an attempt to find municipalities
liable for negligent training, control and supervision. 138 Earlier deci-
sions had found that liability under section 1983 could be predicated
on a theory of negligence; 139 it is significant, however, that they all
134. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187. See also Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869,
873 (6th Cir. 1982).
135. See text accompanying notes 242-45 infra.
136. The Guardian Angels thus far largely have avoided suits stemming from
their patrol activities. In February, 1981, 11 Guardian Angels were arrested on
assault charges arising out of an incident on the subway. The charges were dropped
later, however, and the group members were cleared of any wrongdoing. Pick, supra
note 2, at 42. In addition, in March, 1981, a plaintiff brought suit against the
Guardian Angels, the New York City Transit Authority and New York City, alleging
physical injury. Adames v. City of New York, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 26, 1982, at 5, col. 2
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Apr. 13, 1982).
137. Jamison v. McCurrie, 565 F.2d 483, 486 (7th Cir. 1977) (no constitutional
cause of action for mere negligence; plaintiff must show misbehavior was either
intentional or in reckless disregard of constitutional rights); Bonner v. Coughlin, 545
F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (alleged actions, neither intentional nor in
reckless disregard of plaintiff's constitutional rights, insufficient to satisfy § 1983);
United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 719-21 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Gutierrez v. Department of Pub. Safety, 414 U.S. 1146 (1973) (eighth
amendment not violated by prison guards' negligent supervision of an inmate; plain-
tiff cannot recover damages under § 1983 in the absence of intentional infliction of
cruel punishment or callous indifference); Schweiker v. Gordon, 442 F. Supp. 1134,
1138 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (plaintiff beaten by police officer, claim against police commis-
sioner cannot be based on mere negligence).
138. Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1982).
139. Parker v. McKeithen, 488 F.2d 553, 556, & n. 6 (5th Cir.),. cert. denied, 419
U.S. 838 (1974). Parker implied that negligence could be actionable under § 1983. In
Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C.Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973), a plaintiff beaten by a police
officer sought to hold supervisory officials and the District of Columbia liable for
negligence in failing to train and supervise the officer. The District of Columbia
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predated the Supreme Court's decision in Rizzo v. Goode,140 which
has been characterized as "[tihe major impediment to simple negli-
gence as a basis for liability of supervisory officials and municipalities.
" 141
Rizzo, a section 1983 suit against the mayor of Philadelphia, the
police commissioner, and the city managing director, involved an
alleged pattern of illegal, unconstitutional police behavior directed at
minority citizens. 42  The Supreme Court reversed the previously
granted injunctive relief,143 finding "no affirmative link between the
occurrence of the various incidents of police misconduct and the
adoption of any plan or policy by [the city officials]-express or
otherwise-showing their authorization or approval of such miscon-
duct.' ' 144  Courts have interpreted Rizzo to require "a showing of
'direct responsibility' for the actions of the individual officers [as] a
prerequisite for liability. The mere 'failure to act [even] in the face of
a statistical pattern' of incidents of misconduct [is an] insufficient"
basis for liability.145 Decisions since Rizzo, such as Herrera and Tur-
pin, which hold that official inaction in the face of a pattern of
misconduct could lead to municipal liability, 14  seemingly have
eroded the Rizzo holding. Nevertheless, courts have been reluctant to
confront the implications of Herrera and Turpin and adopt the negli-
gence standard in the face of Rizzo. 147
In Hays v. Jefferson County,148 the plaintiffs, who suffered injuries
during a violent altercation between police and demonstrators, sued
escaped liability in this pre-Monell decision, id. at 369, although it was found that
the District had "a duty to supervise, train and control its police officers." Id. at 368.
Regarding the supervisory officials, Carter held "they are ... subject to suit under §
1983 for any negligent breach of duty that may have caused appellant to be subjected
to a deprivation of constitutional rights." Id. at 365. As noted in Hays v. Jefferson
County, 668 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1982), "it is significant that [Carter] predates the
Supreme Court's decision in Rizzo v. Goode." Id. at 873 n.2 (citations omitted).
140. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
141. Hays, 668 F.2d at 873.
142. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 366-67.
143. The district court required the defendants to submit a comprehensive pro-
gram for improving the handling of complaints alleging police misconduct. The
court of appeals affirmed the choice of equitable relief. Id. at 365-66, citing 506 F.2d
542, 548 (1974).
144. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371.
145. See, e.g., Hays, 668 F.2d at 873-74, quoting Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 376.
146. See, e.g, Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1980).
147. See, e.g., Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 873-74 (6th Cir. 1982);
Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc); Edmonds v. Dillin,
485 F. Supp. 722, 725 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Rheuark v. Shaw, 477 F. Supp. 879, 911
(N.D. Tex. 1979); Leite v. City of Providence, 463 F. Supp. 585, 590 (D.R.I.1978).
148. 668 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1982).
1982]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
the county, the police chief, and deputy chief, alleging that the de-
fendants were negligent in the training, supervision and control of the
unidentified officers. 149 Ruling that "simple negligence [was] insuffi-
cient to support liability of high police officials and municipalities for
inadequate training, supervision and control of individual officers,"1 50
the court vacated the jury verdict rendered for the plaintiff. 151 Hays
recognized the Supreme Court's requirement in Monroe that section
1983 claims be viewed in light of traditional tort law principles 152 but
noted the trend of case law rejecting section 1983 liability in isolated
instances involving a negligent failure to supervise, train or control. 153
Several lower federal courts expressly have rejected negligence as a
sufficient predicate for section 1983 municipal liability under Rizzo 1 4
and, instead, have required a higher level of culpability to support
liability. Where the constitutional violation was not part of a pattern
of past misconduct, Hays would require a "complete failure to train
the police force, or training that is so reckless or grossly negligent that
future police misconduct is almost inevitable . . . or would properly
be characterized as substantially certain to result." 155 Other decisions
similarly require behavior that is intentional, in reckless disregard of
the plaintiff's rights, 156 or that evidences callous indifference. 15 7  In
149. Id. at 871.
150. Id. at 872.
151. Id.
152. Hays, 668 F.2d at 873, quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
153. Hays, 668 F.2d at 873. In Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976)
(en banc), the plaintiff brought an action against the director of a state department
of corrections and two prison guards, alleging that the guards' negligence in leaving
his cell door ajar following a search resulted in the theft of his trial transcript,
thereby violating his due process rights. Id. at 566. The court ruled that the guards'
negligence did not support an action under § 1983. Interpreting the "tort liability"
language in Monroe, see text accompanying note 134 supra, Bonner explained that
[a]ll that . . . Monroe really establishes is that a specific intent to violate
constitutional rights of the plaintiff is not required for a Section 1983
violation. But the introduction of a general intent yardstick into the deter-
mination of whether conduct is State action. . . does not mean that mere
negligence is actionable under section 1983.
Bonner, 545 F.2d at 567.
154. 423 U.S. 362 (1976). See cases cited in note 137 supra. For example, Hays
noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Rizzo v. Goode stands as "[t]he major
impediment to simple negligence as a basis for liability of supervisory officials and
municipalities." Hays, 668 F.2d at 873.
155. Hays, 668 F.2d at 874, citing Rheuark v. Shaw, 477 F. Supp. 897, 911
(N.D.Tex. 1979); Leite v. City of Providence, 463 F. Supp. 585, 590 (D.R.I. 1978).
156. See, e.g., Jamison v. McCurrie, 565 F.2d 483, 486 (7th Cir. 1977); Bonner
v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 1976).
157. United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 719-21 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied sub. nom. Gutierrez v. Department of Pub. Safety, 414 U.S. 1146
(1973).
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Edmonds v. Dillin, 5 the plaintiffs proceeded against two cities, their
police departments, and several individual officers, alleging that the
defendant municipalities' failure to establish and enforce adequate
rules and regulations governing training and conduct "resulted in the
arbitrary and capricious enforcement of the law by defendant police
officers.' 59  Seeking to avoid the difficulty in defining gross negli-
gence or recklessness, Edmonds adopted a different standard for use in
a " 'police training' case under Monell":
If a municipality completely fails to train its police force, or trains
its officers in a manner that is in reckless disregard of the need to
inform and instruct police officers to perform their duties in con-
formity with the constitution, and if the municipality might rea-
sonably foresee that unconstitutional actions of its police officers
might be committed by reason of the municipality's failure or
reckless disregard, then the municipality would have implicitly
authorized or acquiesced in such future unconstitutional acts.6 0
Regardless of the standard adopted, it is doubtful whether a plain-
tiff could hold the municipality liable on a negligence theory for an
incident involving a group like the Guardian Angels. First, only two
unrelated reports of physical confrontations involving the Guardian
Angels exist and proof of a pattern of misconduct is unlikely.'
Second, the Memorandum of Understanding adopted by the Guard-
ian Angels and the police department contemplates training of the
group.16 2 A plaintiff, therefore, would experience difficulty in show-
ing a complete failure to train, a reckless disregard of the need for
training, or the inevitability of the group's misconduct.
B. Direct Action under the Fourteenth Amendment
A party injured or falsely imprisoned by a volunteer anticrime
patrol seeking to hold a municipality liable6 3 may sue for damages in
158. 485 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
159. Id. at 725.
160. Id. at 727. Measuring the allegations against this standard, Edmonds found
the complaint insufficient to impose municipal liability under § 1983. The court
noted that there was no allegation that the city exhibited "a wilful or reckless
disregard of the need to instruct its police to perform their duties constitutionally and
without discriminatory intent .... Id.
161. See note 136 supra.
162. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1981, § B, at 5, col. 1; MEMORANDUM, supra note 9,
1.
163. See note 17 supra regarding the incentives for holding a municipality liable
for the torts of volunteers.
1982]
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a Bivens-type action directly under the fourteenth amendment.1 6 4 In
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 1 5 the plaintiff al-
leged that federal narcotics agents, acting under claim of federal
authority, conducted a search of his apartment without a warrant.16
The agents then took the plaintiff to a federal courthouse and sub-
jected him to a visual strip search. 6 7  The plaintiff brought suit
against the agents involved, alleging great humiliation, embarrass-
ment and mental suffering as a result of the unlawful conduct. The
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had a cause of action for
damages against the federal officers who conducted the unconstitu-
tional search and seizure 16 8 directly under the fourth amendment.16 9
Two considerations prompted the Supreme Court to imply the cause
of action: first, "[there were] no special factors counselling hesita-
tion," 170 and, second, there was no "equally effective" remedy. 171
Under the Bivens rationale, the Supreme Court has extended the
direct constitutional action to the fifth 172 and eighth amendments.
73
164. See notes 178-79 & 185-89 infra and accompanying text for cases allowing
Bivens suits against non-federal defendants.
165. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
166. Id. at 389. The agents allegedly manacled the plaintiff in front of his
family, threatening to arrest them all. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 397.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 396.
171. Id. at 397.
172. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). In Davis, a former Congressional
staff member alleged that her Congressman employer had discriminated against her
on the basis of her sex by terminating her employment. Finding that the fifth
amendment included a right to be free from illegal discrimination, id. at 236, Davis
extended Bivens beyond its previous application to the fourth amendment and held
that the plaintiff had a cause of action for damages under the fifth amendment. Id.
at 248-49. Davis noted the two constraints of Bivens, see text accompanying notes
170-71 supra, but found " 'no special factors counselling hesitation.' " Id. at 245,
quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. Factors reviewed included (1) propriety of a
damages remedy; (2) effect of a suit against a Congressman; (3) absence of an explicit
Congressional prohibition against money damages; and (4) a fear of increased federal
litigation. Davis, 442 U.S. at 245-48. In addition, as in Bivens, there were "no other
alternative forms of judicial relief" available for the plaintiff. Id. at 245. Specifically,
§ 717 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 86 Stat. 111, (codified at 42 U.S.C.
2000e-16(a) (1976)), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin," id., does not protect congressional employees such
as the plaintiff. Additionally, the relevant rule of the House of Representatives, H.R.
Rule XLIII, cl.9, reprinted in 121 CONG. REC. 22 (1975), which prohibits sex discrim-
ination "as part of the Code of Official Conduct of the House," was not adopted until
approximately six months after the plaintiff's discharge. Id.
173. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). Carlson has been viewed as enunciat-
ing "clearer and less restrictive criteria for a private constitutional right of action
616 [Vol. X
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The Court's reticence in enunciating what factors might "counsel
hesitation," 1 4 however, has led to confusion in the lower courts re-
garding the applicability of Bivens to non-federal defendants. 175 By
contrast, less confusion surrounds the instances where "equally effec-
tive" remedies preclude the direct constitutional action.176
1. The Non-Federal Defendant
Only a few courts have applied Bivens to defendants other than
federal officials. 177  In these decisions, courts have found either that
even when alternative remedies are available." Shewmaker v. Minchew, 666 F.2d
616, 617 (D.C.Cir. 1981) (per curiam). In Carlson, a prisoner was admitted to a
federal prison hospital following a severe asthma attack. Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d
669, 671 (7th Cir. 1978). He was in the hospital for over eight hours but was never
examined by a physician. Eventually, an unlicensed nurse placed him on a respirator
known to be inoperative, although the prisoner protested that the apparatus made
breathing more difficult; in addition, he was given a drug contraindicated for
asthmatics. Thirty minutes later, the prisoner suffered a respiratory arrest and died.
Id. The deceased's mother commenced suit on behalf of her son's estate, alleging that
prison officials' violations of his due process, equal protection, and eighth amend-
ment rights caused personal injuries leading to his death. Id. Despite the availability
of an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the Court nevertheless held
that a Bivens action under the eighth amendment was appropriate. Carlson, 446
U.S. at 19-23. A major factor in the decision, which contrasted the action under
FTCA with the direct constitutional action, was the inadequacy of the FTCA in
redressing this wrong. Id. at 18-23.
Carlson expressly affirmed the holding in Bivens: "victims of a constitutional
violation by a federal agent have a right to recover damages against the official in
federal court despite the absence of any statute conferring such a right." Id. at 18.
Such a cause of action may be defeated, however, in two situations: first, "when
defendants demonstrate 'special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of af-
firmative action by Congress,' " id., citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396, and Davis, 442
U.S. at 245, and, second, "when defendants show that Congress has provided an
alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly
under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective." Carlson, 446 U'.S. at 18-19,
citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 and Davis, 442 U.S. at 245-47. Finding neither
situation present, the court allowed the direct action under the eighth amendment.
Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-23.
174. Carlson failed to define what special factors might counsel hesitation,
merely noting that none were present. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19. See also Bush v.
Lucas, 647 F.2d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[t]here is little guidance in the Supreme
Court opinions as to what 'special factors' will justify witholding a Bivens remedy").
See generally Note, Constitutional Law: Bivens Again, 10 STETSON L. REV. 329, 332
(1981).
175. See cases cited at note 177 infra.
176. See cases cited at note 196 infra.
177. Zerilli v. Evening News Ass'n, 628 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1980); McNally v.
Pulitzer Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976);
Yiamouyiannis v. Chemical Abstracts Serv., Inc., 521 F.2d 1392 (6th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978); Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v.
American Broadcasting Co., 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1088-89 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated
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the "private party" acted in concert with a federal official 78 or that
significant federal funding of the activity existed.17 Given the non-
federal status of anticrime volunteers and municipalities, the scope of
Bivens becomes a threshold question-if the private status of a defend-
ant should "counsel hesitation," then volunteer actors such as the
Guardian Angels and local municipal officials should escape Bivens
liability under the fourteenth amendment.
Zerilli v. Evening News Association'8 0 examined whether the pri-
vate status of a defendant "counselled hesitation" in implying a Bivens
action. In Zerilli, the Department of Justice allegedly conducted a
"bugging" operation and later disclosed the communications to a
defendant newspaper which published the material in a series of
articles on organized crime.'' The plaintiffs commenced suit against
the United States Attorney General, unknown agents of the Justice
Department, and the publisher of the newspaper. In addition to
statutory claims,182 the plaintiffs sued the federal defendants and the
and remanded, 609 F.2d 355, 360 (9th Cir. 1979); Gardels v. Murphy, 377 F. Supp.
1.389 (N.D. I11. 1974). See generally Lehmann, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of
a Constitutional Cause of Action for Torts Committed By Government Officials, 4
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q., 531 (1977). This commentator analyzed four decisions im-
posing Bivens liability on non-federal officials and concluded that the decisions were
"1arguably not legitimate extensions of Bivens. " Id. at 578. Where private parties are
concerned, federalism suggests that state tort law should govern their disputes. Id. In
addition, where a state official or private party acts unconstitutionally, adequate
remedies are provided through various sections of the Civil Rights Act, specifically,
§§ 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1985(3). Id. at 578-79. Another commentator concluded
that in Carlson, the Court "emphasized the Bivens remedy as a federal response to
federal wrongdoing. In so doing, the Court restricted any analogy to wrongdoing by
state officials." Note, Constitutional Law: Bivens Again, 10 STETSON L. REV. 329,
342 (1981).
178. McNally v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 855 (1976) (Assistant United States Attorney allegedly provided private
newspaper with the plaintiff's psychiatric reports which it published, thereby violat-
ing right of privacy); Gardels v. Murphy, 377 F. Supp. 1389 (N.D. Ill. 1974). See
notes 185-89 infra and accompanying text.
179. Yiamouyiannis v. Chemical Abstracts Serv., Inc., 521 F.2d 1392 (6th Cir.
1.975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978) (the plaintiff alleged that
discharge by an employer who received federal funding violated his first amendment
rights). But see Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556, 562 n.13 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975). In Greenya, the court ruled that the
"Constitution, unlike section 1983, does not automatically create an action for money
damages for all deprivations of constitutional rights," id. at 562 n.13, even when
"significant government funding" exists. Id. at 560.
180. 628 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
181. Id. at 218.
182. The plaintiffs also sued under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978),
which concerns issues such as "wiretapping and other interceptions of wire and oral
communications." Zerilli, 628 F.2d at 219.
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newspaper directly under the fourth amendment. Faced with the
issue of whether the newspaper, as a private party, was susceptible to
a Bivens suit, the court reasoned that "a defendant's private status
[was one factor that] should at least 'counsel hesitation' in the creation
of Bivens liability, for the primary purpose of the Bivens doctrine is to
remedy abuses by those who act as agents for the sovereign."'' 83
Zerilli, therefore, declined to extend Bivens to hold the newspaper
liable. 184
According to at least one decision, a volunteer's ostensibly private
status does not necessarily absolve a defendant from Bivens liability.
In Gardels v. Murphy, Vietnam protestors alleged that employees and
agents of the presidential public relations office harrassed them during
a demonstration and prevented them from expressing their views. 185
One defendant sought to escape Bivens liability by arguing that he
was a "sparetime voluntary advanceman." 86 The court rejected his
argument18 7 because it "[saw] no reason why the [White House] Ad-
vance Office could not delegate part of its authority and duty to aid in
the logistics and preparation of a presidential trip to a political party,
which party and its agents would then be acting under color of federal
authority."'8 18  Other indicia included his performance of work as-
183. Zerilli, 628 F.2d at 224. The court noted two additional "special factors"
that, taken together with the defendant newspaper's private status, prevented it from
imposing Bivens liability. First, the central thrust of the fourth amendment-
searches and seizures-did not govern the challenged disclosure and publication Id.
at 223. "The fourth amendment is addressed only to 'searches and seizures,' and the
basic constitutional wrong has been fully accomplished when the unlawful search or
seizure has been completed." Id. Second, it reasoned that concerns for a free press
counselled against imposing liability on a newspaper "for uncovering and publishing
information that it deems newsworthy." Id. at 224. The Bivens claim against the
federal defendants was dismissed on the grounds that a separate action on the same
subject matter was already pending before the court. Id. at 222.
184. Id. at 223-24. Compare Zerilli with Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v.
American Broadcast Co., 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated and re-
manded, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), where a district court implied a Bivens remedy
for first amendment rights against non-federal defendants. In Writers Guild, an
association of writers and directors sued the television networks and the Federal
Communications Commission, challenging the "family viewing policy" which re-
stricted certain kinds of programs during hours when children were likely to be
viewers. 423 F. Supp. at 1072. The court said there was "no doubt" that the first
amendment created personal federal rights. Id. at 1088. In addition, because dam-
ages are the "ordinary remedy for [an] invasion of personal interests," a direct
Constitutional action was appropriate. Id. at 1089.
185. 377 F. Supp. 1389, 1392 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
186. Id. at 1398.
187. Id. at 1399. The court analogized to decisions finding "state action" by
political parties under § 1983.
188. Id.
19821
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signed by the public relations office and his access to areas where the
general public was not permitted.18
Although it remains unclear whether courts will apply Bivens to
non-federal defendants,9 0 the private status of the defendant remains
at least a factor counselling hesitation in applying the Bivens rem-
edy. 191 Zerilli's refusal to extend Bivens to private defendants on the
ground that the direct constitutional action is intended to redress
wrongs committed by the agents of a sovereign does not necessarily
preclude application of the doctrine to anticrime volunteers. Under
Bivens, however, courts also must consider whether remedies exist
which adequately redress the injury. Unlike the uncertainty surround-
ing "special factors," courts have had noticeably less difficulty in
determining whether alternative remedies prevent a direct constitu-
tional action.
2. Section 1983: An Equally Effective Remedy
The complex procedural history of Turpin v. Mailet 19 2 illustrates
the judicial treatment of Bivens actions in the face of section 1983
claims. In Turpin, handed down one day before the Supreme Court's
decision in Monell, the Second Circuit noted that municipal immunity
from suit left the plaintiff without a section 1983 remedy. As a result, the
court allowed the plaintiff to proceed against a municipality directly
189. Id.
190. Zerilli, 628 F.2d at 223. As noted in Zerilli, "[t]he Supreme Court has never
discussed the possibility that Bivens liability might extend beyond federal officials
and reach private actors who in some way have participated in a governmental
violation of constitutional rights." Id.
191. See id. at 223-24.
192. 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.) (en banc), vacated sub nom. City of West Haven v.
Turpin, 439 U.S. 974 (1978), modified on remand, 591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979) (en
banc). In "Turpin I," the court ruled that the city could be held liable for unconstitu-
tional actions directly under the fourteenth amendment. 579 F.2d at 152 (2d Cir.
1978). One day later, the Supreme Court held that municipalities could be sued
under § 1983 for causing the violation of constitutional rights. Monell v. Department
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Supreme Court then vacated the decision
in "Turpin 1," 439 U.S. at 974 , and instructed the Second Circuit to reconsider its
prior ruling in light of Monell. Based on the plaintiff's allegations, the prior decision
was modified with instructions to the trial court to permit the plaintiff to proceed
against the city under § 1983. "Turpin II," 591 F.2d at 426. At trial, the jury found
the city and the officer jointly liable. On appeal, the court held that the plaintiff's
evidence was insufficient to prove any "official policy" on the part of the municipal-
ity, as required by Monell. 619 F.2d 196, 203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. City of
West Haven v. Turpin, 446 U.S. 1016 (1980) ("Turpin III"). See text accompanying
notes 38-45 supra for a discussion of Turpin in connection with "official policy"
under § 1983.
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under the fourteenth amendment. 93 Reconsidering the propriety of
the action in light of Monell as mandated by the Supreme Court, the
Second Circuit reversed and held: "there is no place for a cause of
action against a municipality directly under the 14th Amendment,
because the plaintiff may proceed against the city . . . under §
1983.' 94  Therefore, the pre-Monell unavailability of the section
1983 action against a municipality initially led the court to imply the
remedy against the municipality under the fourteenth amend-
ment.19 5  The reversal in Turpin demonstrates that the section 1983
action may be a bar to the direct action.196
To overcome an unfavorable result as in Turpin, plaintiffs have
argued that Monell's rejection of respondeat superior under section
1983 denies them an "equally effective" statutory remedy, thereby
permitting a Bivens direct constitutional action under the fourteenth
193. "Turpin I," 579 F.2d at 156-58, 168. The court cautioned, however, that
municipal liability could be predicated on a theory of respondeat superior under the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 168. To impose liability on the municipality under a
theory of respondeat superior would be "fundamentally inconsistent with the import
of Bivens. To the extent that one allows recovery under a theory of respondeat
superior, an additional remedy is being created for a single constitutional infraction."
Id. at 166. In addition, "[w]e cannot... ignore the fact that Congress has provided
a primary remedy under § 1983 against the employees themselves, and has chosen not
to impose vicarious liability upon the municipality." Id.
194. "Turpin II," 591 F.2d 426, 427.
195. Id. at 427.
196. See Pauk v. Board of Trustees of City Univ. of New York, 654 F.2d 856, 865
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3716 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1982) (No. 81-1091)
("when § 1983 provides a remedy, an implied cause of action grounded on the
constitution is not available."); Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349, 357 (8th Cir. 1980);
(existence of Congressionally created civil service remedies obviates a Bivens remedy
inferred from the constitution); Cullen v. Margiotta, 618 F.2d 226, 227 (2d Cir.
1980) (per curiam) (impliedly affirming district court's holding that relief under §
1983 precluded a direct cause of action under the constitution); Dominguez v.
Beame, 603 F.2d 337, 340 n.2 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980) ("[i]n
light of Turpin v. Mailet .... we need not consider appellant's complaint insofar as
it attempts to state a cause of action directly under the Fourteenth Amendment");
Owen v. City of Independence, 589 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds,
445 U.S. 622 (1980) ("[a] post-Monell interpretation of section 1983 permits the
[plaintiff] to sue the [defendant] [C]ity ... directly and, therefore, we find it
unnecessary to rely on the Bivens doctrine as we did in our previous opinion"); Cale
v. City of Covington, 586 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1978) (no Bivens action, given the
availability of a suit under § 1983 against municipal officers); Mahone v. Waddle,
564 F.2d 1018, 1024-25 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904 (1978) ("Bivens
teaches that the existence of an effective substantial federal statutory remedy ....
obviates the need to imply a constitutional remedy."); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37
(1st Cir. 1977) (existence of statutory remedy may render a Bivens analysis inappro-
priate).
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amendment. 97 However, just as courts have rejected respondeat
superior under section 1983,198 they similarly have declined to predi-
cate municipal liability on this theory in Bivens actions.199
In Dean v. Gladney, confrontations between police and beachgoers
led to a Bivens claim.200 Spectators gathered to view the arrest of two
men and police began to make indiscriminate arrests. 20 1 The police
arrested three bystanders 20 2 and placed them in an unventilated patrol
car for about one and one-half hours; in addition, they denied the
women whom they arrested the use of restroom facilities at the
jail.20 3 The women brought suit against the officers involved, the
sheriff, 20 4 the county, and the two cities. The court ruled that "Bivens
does not sanction the imposition of, and should not be read to impose"
respondeat superior liability on a municipality for its employees' acts.
20 5
197. In Dean v. Cladney, 621 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom.
Dean v. County of Brazoria, 450 U.S. 983 (1981), the court considered a claim
alleging police brutality under § 1983 and Bivens. See notes 200-10 infra and accom-
panying text. The court cited Hearth Inc. v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 617 F.2d
381 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), where a possibility of a § 1983 claim precluded a
Bivens-type action. Dean, 621 F.2d at 1336 n.14. The Dean court noted that the
plaintiffs in the instant action, unlike Hearth, grounded their § 1983 claim on a
respondeat superior theory-a theory rejected by Monell. Without passing on the
argument, Dean stated that "it is at least arguable that a Bivens-type action is
appropriate here even though it was not in Hearth.'" Id.
198. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
199. Dean v. Gladney, 621 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Dean v.
County of Brazoria, 450 U.S. 983 (1980); Jones v. City of Memphis, 586 F.2d 622
(6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 914 (1979); Cale v. City of Covington, 586
F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1978); Molina v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1978); Nix v. Sweeney, 573 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 929 (1979).
200. 621 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Dean v. County of
Brazoria, 450 U.S. 983 (1981). Plaintiffs alleged violations of the first, fourth, eighth,
and fourteenth amendments, and §§ 1981, 1983, and 1988. Id. at 1332, 1334. They
raised only the Bivens claim on appeal. Id. at 1335 n.11.
201. Id. at 1332.
202. Id. at 1333. An officer warned two of the bystanders that if they did not
cease taking photographs, he would "smash the camera into their heads." Id. The
third had been waiting for her friends to return. Id.
203. Id. at 1332-33.
204. The sheriff allegedly had instructed the men that " 'unlawful force would
be met with lawful force.' " Id. at 1332.
205. Id. at 1335. The court found support for its conclusion in decisions in six
separate circuits passing on the question. Id., citing Jones v. City of Memphis, 586
F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 914 (1979); Cale v. City of Coving-
ton, 586 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1978); Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.) (en
banc), vacated sub nom. City of West Haven v. Turpin, 439 U.S. 974, modified on
remand, 591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979) (en banc); Nix v. Sweeney, 573 F.2d 998 (8th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 929 (1979); Jamison v. McCurrie, 565 F.2d 483
(7th Cir. 1977); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977).
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Rather, several arguments militated against respondeat superior: the
requirement of culpability in Bivens;206 fiscal considerations of in-
creased litigation; 20 7 and, importantly, the need for congruence 20
with the result in Monell209 to avoid circumvention of the prohibition
against respondeat superior.210 The court in Molina v. Richardson211
also prevented a plaintiff proceeding in a Bivens action from holding a
municipality liable on the basis of respondeat superior, albeit under
an analysis differing from Dean. Police in Molina removed the plain-
tiff driver from his car by force when he refused to hand over his
driver's license. 212  After a struggle, they booked him for resisting
206. Jones, 586 F.2d at 625 (imposing liability under theory of respondeat supe-
rior considered fundamentally inconsistent with the import of Bivens); Kostka, 560
F.2d at 42 ("the Court's methodology [in Bivens] belies any claim that Bivens should
be understood as recognizing sweeping federal judicial power to create damage
remedies to vindicate constitutional rights").
207. Cale, 586 F.2d at 317; Nix, 573 F.2d at 1003. Dean stated that, unlike the
situation presented in Bivens, state and local fiscal policies are implicated when a suit
is brought against a municipality on a respondeat superior theory. Dean, 621 F.2d at
1336.
208. " 'It would be incongruous to hold that the doctrine of respondeat superior
can be invoked against a municipal corporation in an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(a Bivens-type action) when the doctrine has no application in an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.' " Dean, 621 F.2d at 1336, quoting Jones v. City of Memphis, 586
F.2d at 625.
209. Dean, 621 F.2d at 1336-37. "Although the standards of liability under
section 1983 are not necessarily applicable to constitutional claims in a Bivens-type
action, we are reluctant to extend the scope of municipal liability in the face of the
Supreme Court's clear pronouncement in Monell and in the absence of affirmative
action by Congress to impose respondeat superior liability on municipalities in either
context." Id. (footnote omitted). The standards are "not necessarily applicable"
because, although the two actions are analogous, they are not identical. Id. at 1336-
37. In addition, the court noted commentary support for respondeat superior liability
in Bivens actions. The court also recognized that a rejection of respondeat superior
effectively could foreclose some victims' only opportunity to secure compensation for
their damages. Id. at 1337 n.15, citing Hundt, Suing Municipalities Directly under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 770, 780-82 (1975); Note, A Federal
Cause of Action Against a Municipality for Fourth Amendment Violations by its
Agents, 42 GEO. WASH L. REV. 850, 853, 861 (1974); Note, Damage Remedies
Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89 HARv. L. REV. 922 (1976);
Comment, Section 1983 Municipal Liability and the Doctrine of Respondeat Supe-
rior, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 952 n.79 (1979). See also Note, "Damages or Noth-
ing"-The Efficacy of the Bivens-Type Remedy, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 667, 672 n.2
(1979).
210. Dean, 621 F.2d at 1336. "To impose liability on the basis of respondeat
superior in a Bivens-type action against a local governmental entity would . . .
permit plaintiffs to circumvent the restrictions imposed in Monell on a section 1983
claim." Id.
211. 578 F.2d 846 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1978).
212. Id.at 847.
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arrest but filed no charges. 1 13 Claiming physical injuries stemming
from the incident, the plaintiff commenced suit against the police
officers under section 1983 and the fourth, fifth and eighth amend-
ments, seeking to hold the city liable on a theory of respondeat supe-
rior.21 4 Conceding that Monell barred a section 1983 action against
the city, the plaintiff sought the direct Bivens action as a substitute
remedy. 21 5 The court rejected the claim but chose not to rely on the
"alternative remedy" theory as had the court in Dean.2 16  Instead,
Molina articulated two additional reasons for not allowing the direct
action against municipalities on a theory of respondeat superior: re-
spect for the role of Congress and concern for the principles of federal-
ism. First, Molina recognized that the implementation of constitu-
tional guarantees is "primarily a legislative task" 21 7 and that Congress
chose to exclude municipalities from vicarious liability under section
1983.218 Second, extensive federal involvement in disputes between
local governments and individual citizens would only deter the states
and political subdivisions from developing their own solutions.219
No one of the factors mentioned in Dean, Molina or Turpin neces-
sarily would preclude every action asserted directly under the Consti-
tution. In the case of a person injured by a volunteer patrol member,
however, the considerations mentioned by the courts, especially the
judicial rejection of respondeat superior, probably would render un-
successful an attempt to hold the municipal corporation liable in an
action directly under the Constitution.
C. State Tort Claims
Although Monell's rejection of respondeat superior may prevent a
plaintiff from recovering against a municipality under section 1983
and Bivens, additional avenues still may exist under state tort law in
jurisdictions where such claims are not barred by governmental im-
munity. 2 0 Most likely, a party injured by a volunteer group member
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 847-48.
216. See note 209 supra.
217. Molina, 578 F.2d at 851.
218. Id. "[S]urely it is appropriate for the federal judiciary to respect that
considered legislative reticence." Id. In addition, the fourteenth amendment "coun-
sels an especially heightened sensitivity to the traditional role of Congress in imple-
menting constitutional principles through the legislative process." Id. at 852.
219. Id.
220. See notes 224-25 infra.
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will proceed under one of two theories:221 (1) that the municipal
corporation "master" is liable for the torts of his volunteer "servant"
under the doctrine of respondeat superior,222 or (2) that an analogy
exists between the volunteer group and the uniformed or auxiliary
police whose activities are authorized by state law.22 3 A plaintiff may
encounter governmental2 2 4 or municipal2 25 immunity from suits in
some jurisdictions, however, which would preclude recovery. In New
221. Additional theories that suggest themselves would be unavailing. Any the-
ory of agency is irrelevant because the injured party is not seeking to enforce a
contract against the municipality. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958);
see also F. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 12 (4th ed. 1952); W.
SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 3(F) (1964). Under a second theory,
ratification of a tort by the master, the injured party would have to establish that the
tortious actor was intending to act for the purported master, a difficult showing. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 85; MECHEM § 212. A third theory, apparent
authority, has been unsuccessful in this context. Adames v. City of New York,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 26, 1982, at 5, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Apr. 13, 1982). The
Adames court ruled that the actions of the principal must reasonably cause a third
party to believe that another is the principal's agent and that the third party must
reasonably rely on the apparent authority to his detriment. The plaintiff had not
pleaded reliance adequately.
222. See note 34 supra and notes 228-35 infra and accompanying text.
223. See notes 246-65 infra and accompanying text.
224. Generally, states and municipal corporations enjoyed an immunity from
tort liability until the early 1900's. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 131 (4th ed. 1971). This immunity has been judicially and statutorily eroded and,
at present, exists only in a minority of jurisdictions. For a general discussion of the
abrogation of governmental immunity, see 18 MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS §§ 53.01-02 (rev. 3d ed. & Supp. 1981); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 29.1 n.2 commentary (Supp. 1968). For an early decision rejecting
immunity, see Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. Sup. Ct.
1957) (en banc) (holding that a municipal corporation may be held liable for the torts
of police officers under respondeat superior). For an example of statutory abrogation,
see N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963), note 226 infra. Depending on the
jurisdiction, the government's liability ranges from full immunity to liability coex-
tensive with the private individual's or corporation's. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 (4th ed. 1971); 18 MCQUILLIN, supra, § 53.02.
225. Generally, a municipal corporation is not liable for the acts of its officers in
enforcing police regulations. 18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 224, § 53.22(c). This is due
to the distinction that developed in relation to municipal corporation's dual charac-
ter, which is both corporate and governmental. Traditionally, the law has distin-
guished between certain governmental functions, for which the government is im-
mune from tort liability, and proprietary functions, which are not cloaked with this
immunity. W. PROSSER, supra note 224, § 131. In addition, it is "firmly established
that the operation of a police department is a governmental function, and that acts or
omissions in connection therewith ordinarily do not give rise to liability on the part of
the municipality." 18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 224, § 53.51. In jurisdictions where
such liability has been imposed by statute-as in 13 states-the municipality would
be liable for such actions; this liability is not limited to police officers but includes all
officers and agents of the municipality engaged in executing police powers and
regulations. Id. § 53.22(c) nn.2-3.
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York, where the legislature has abrogated governmental immunity, 226
municipalities have been held liable for injuries resulting from assaults
committed by police officers during the performance of their govern-
mental functions. 2 7
1. Respondeat Superior
Unlike the claims grounded on federal law, an injured party may
raise the doctrine of respondeat superior228 under state common law
and hold the municipality liable for the torts of volunteers. In New
York,22 9 municipal liability is identical to that of individuals or corpo-
rations. 230 While respondeat superior applies to municipal officers
and employees, 23 1 a plaintiff nevertheless must demonstrate that the
servant is one employed to perform services for another where, "with
respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services [that
person] is subject to the other's control or right to control ' 232 in order
to hold the master liable. A volunteer donating services without an
employment contract or compensation may function as a servant of
one accepting those services. 233 The mere right to control, however,
does not automatically result in a finding of a master-servant relation-
ship because, in addition, "[tihere must be consent or manifestation of
consent to the existence of the relation by the person for whom the
service is performed .... -234 Therefore, a court may not find the
volunteer to be a servant where the master neither exercises control
nor consents to the relationship. The Memorandum of Understanding
reached between New York City and the Guardian Angels illustrates a
226. See N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 8 (McKinney 1963). The statute provides that "[t]he
state hereby waives its immunity from liability and . . . assumes liability . . . in
accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions . . . against individuals
or corporations ......
227. Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945);
McCarthy v. City of Saratoga Springs, 269 A.D. 469, 56 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dep't
1945); Egan v. State, 255 A.D. 825, 7 N.Y.S.2d 64 (4th Dep't 1938).
228. See note 34 supra.
229. McCarthy v. City of Saratoga Springs, 269 A.D. 469, 56 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d
Dep't 1945).
230. N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 8 (McKinney 1963).
231. Collins v. City of New York, 11 Misc. 2d 76, 171 N.Y.S.2d 710 (Sup. Ct.
1958), aff'd mem., 8 A.D.2d 613, 185 N.Y.S. 740 (1st Dep't), af'd, 7 N.Y.2d 822,
164 N.E.2d 719, 196 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1959).
232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 221, § 220(1) (emphasis
added). Comments to the second Restatement indicate that the relationship of mas-
ter-servant is not capable of exact definition. Id. § 220, comment (c).
233. Id. § 225.
234. Id. § 225, comment (e).
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municipality's desire to avoid liability while it strives to cooperate
with the group's patrol activities and accommodate the need of the
organization to maintain independence in its operations. 235
2. The Memorandum of Understanding
The language of the Memorandum attempts to negate implications
of control and consent for the purpose of master-servant liability,
expressly recognizing the Guardian Angels as "an independent, auton-
omous citizens group ' 236 and stipulating that they are not New York
City employees within the meaning of a state statute which provides
for indemnification of city employees from liability for acts performed
in the scope of their employment. 237 In addition, the Memorandum
equates the group's power to arrest with the right "provided to all
citizens under the law"2 38 and provides that, when an Angel effects an
arrest, the city police officer should cooperate with him. 239  The
Memorandum notes that the Angels wear a uniform but recognizes it
solely for the purposes of identifying group members. 240 Moreover-
and perhaps crucial to the subject of consent and control-the Memo-
randum does not impose specific criteria on the group for selection of
its members, 241 although it allows for name checks for the purpose of
revealing the criminal history of any present or prospective member
2 42
and anticipates the development of criteria to exclude potential mem-
bers with serious criminal records.2 43 Also relevant to the "control"
element is the Angels' agreement to furnish the police department
with information regarding their activities-specifically, notice of
235. MEMORANDUM, supra note 9.
236. Id. 1.
237. Id. 13, citing N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-k(3) (McKinney Supp. 1981-82).
238. MEMORANDUM, supra note 9, 10.
239. Id. The Operations Order issued by the New York City Police Department
adds, "The officer will also assist the Guardian Angel in preparing a report . . .
concerning an arrest in which he is involved." New York City Police Department,
Operations Order No. 45, The Alliance of Guardian Angels, Inc., May 29, 1981, 5.
240. MEMORANDUM, supra note 9, 3. The memorandum provides that "[w]hile
on duty, members ... will be identifiable ... by their distinctive uniform consisting
of: a red beret and a white T-shirt with red lettering reading 'Guardian Angel Safety
Patrol,' featuring an emblem of wings around an eye above clouds." Id.
241. Id. 12.
242. Id. "If a name check discloses that any individual has been convicted of a
felony, a fingerprint check will be conducted of that person and the information
obtained will be provided to the leadership of the Guardian Angels for its determina-
tion of the individuals's [sic] fitness for participation in the organization." Id. (em-
phasis added).
243. Id.
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proposed areas, dates and duration of patrol tours; advance notice of
patrols planned for special public events; and submission of the details
of fixed and definite patrols of the transit system to the transit author-
ity police department. 244 Arguably, the elements of control and con-
sent become more pronounced in view of the agreement to furnish the
information; it seems, however, that the city falls short of exercising
the control or consent necessary to cause liability. The city has the
right to check members but imposes no criteria for their selection. In
addition, although the city has knowledge of patrols, its role is passive
because it does not participate in their scheduling. 245
3. The Propriety of Municipal Immunity
A plaintiff might seek to impose municipal liability for torts com-
mitted by volunteer anticrime groups by pointing to New York City's
use of auxiliary police. Although municipalities currently enjoy immu-
nity for certain torts committed by auxiliaries, 24 a plaintiff may argue
that the city has exceeded the intent of the statute authorizing the use
of auxiliary police 247 and has exploited the auxiliaries and Guardian
Angels "to fill a gap in security created by the limited number of
uniformed police officers assigned to subway security. ' 248 In so do-
ing, the city has derived the benefit of these groups' activities but has
sought to escape liability for torts committed within the scope of the
volunteer anticrime work.
Pursuant to the New York State Defense Emergency Act, 49 the City
of New York is authorized to "[r]ecruit, equip, and train auxiliary
police . . . to perform such other police functions as may be re-
quired .... ,1250 New York City currently uses volunteer auxiliary
police officers who serve "without pay as civic minded citizens. ' 25 1
They are "trained by the regular police forces and are similarly uni-
formed and equipped except that they do not carry guns.- 25 2
244. Id. 8.
245. See text accompanying note 244 supra.
246. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 9193(1) (McKinney 1974).
247. Id. § 9185 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82).
248. In re Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 24, 1982, at 6, col. 3
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Mar. 19, 1982) (patrolmen's group challenged New York
City's use of auxiliaries to patrol the subway).
249. 1951 N.Y. Laws ch. 784 (codified at N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 9101-9202
(McKinney 1974)).
250. New York State Defense Emergency Act, 1951 N.Y. Laws ch. 784 § 23(5)
(codified at N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 9123(22) (McKinney 1974)).
251. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. U, § U51-11.0(a) (1975). For a fuller description of
auxiliary police activities, see N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1982, at B1, col. 1.
252. Id. They are authorized, however, to carry handcuffs. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit.
A, § 436.14.0(b)(5) (1981-82 Cum. Supp.).
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A recent decision construed the Defense Emergency Act to uphold
New York City's use of auxiliary police on weekly subway patrols. In
In re Patrolmen's Benevolent Association,2 53 the plaintiff association
challenged the auxiliary patrols, claiming that, in addition to exceed-
ing the statutory authority, such patrols posed an immediate threat to
the public and the patrolling officer. 254 The court found that "it is
within the . . . clear statutory responsibility and authority to utilize
civilians for this function."'2 55 A closer reading of the decisions cited
by the court indicates that the weekly patrols do not automatically
violate the statutory provisions. To the extent the auxiliaries operate
on a more frequent, regular basis, however, such activity is without
statutory authority. In addition, an informal opinion issued by the
New York State Attorney General makes it clear that the auxiliaries
"may be used in a drill to . . . patrol . . . neighborhoods for the
purpose of maintaining security. '2 56 Similarly, the use of auxiliaries
"has been . . . found to be proper for such activities as patrolling the
streets [and] unprotected public parks in. . . cities of this state during
the late hours . . 7 While performing such activities, both the
individual member and the municipality are immune from liability
for torts committed during the performance of authorized drills.258 It
is important to note in this regard, however, that despite the apparent
scope of permissible auxiliary activities, certain restrictions exist.
While courts have upheld the use of auxiliaries in conducting pa-
trols,259 "[t]hese drill periods must be set up to effectuate their proper
purpose-to train only and not as a subterfuge for the establishment
253. N.Y.L.J., Mar. 24, 1982, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Mar. 19, 1982).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. INF. Op. N.Y. ATTY. GEN., Mar. 21, 1980 at 3.
257. In re Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, N.Y.L.J. Mar. 24, 1982, at 6, col. 3,
citing Portanova v. Scher, 75 Misc. 2d 570, 348 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1973); Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Hitt, 75 Misc. 2d 565, 348 N.Y.S.2d
456 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1972).
258. INF. Op. N.Y. ATTY. GEN., Mar. 21, 1980 at 3, construing N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAWS § 9193. See also Bundy v. Peugeot, 222 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Buffalo City Ct. 1961).
259. See note 257 supra and accompanying text. A "drill" is defined as
[a]ny duly authorized activity of the state civil defense commission or a
local office of civil defense, or subdivision, service or unit thereof, with or
without the participation of the general public, held in training or prepa-
ration for enemy attack or for rehabilitation and recovery procedures
following an attack. Drill is synonymous with authorized test, training, or
training [sic] or practice exercise. Drill includes assistance by civil defense
forces in combating natural or peacetime disasters upon the direction of a
public officer authorized by law to call upon a civil defense director foi
assistance in protecting human life or property.
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 9103(14) (McKinney 1974).
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of the only police department in town. ' 26 0  In In re Portanova v.
Scher,261 a policemen's union challenged a city's use of twenty-three
auxiliary policemen for patrolling parks during the night as an at-
tempt to avoid the appointment of regular police officers. The court
rejected the challenge, finding that the use was "not a broad substitu-
tion of one police force for another." At most it was the "minor and
temporary supplementation of the existing regular force to meet the
expanding problem of law enforcement" limited to specified times and
areas. 
262
The Defense Emergency Act was passed in the early 1950's during
the Cold War.263  Legislative history indicates that the act was in-
tended to provide for civilian defense in the event of foreign attack
and to authorize activity in preparation for such an emergency. By
contrast, nothing in the Act indicates the propriety of using auxiliary
police to conduct drills for routine purposes such as patrolling sub-
ways. 264 The regular use of auxiliaries, therefore, exceeds the statu-
tory authorization and permits cities, under a cloak of immunity, to
accomplish necessary police-type functions through volunteers. In
view of this, the statutory grant of immunity should not attach to the
municipality; instead, municipal immunity should be limited to those
activities falling within the meaning of the Defense Emergency Act.
Immunity for the auxiliaries themselves is on a different footing. As
is the case with volunteer firemen, immunity should be extended to
the individual members to encourage participation in such volunteer
activity. 265 Where the patrols are directed at filling the pressing need
for additional law enforcement, volunteer anticrime groups, as a
matter of policy, should be granted immunity for torts committed in
connection with their activities. Where, however, the municipality
260. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Hitt, 75 Misc. 2d 565, 568, 348 N.Y.S.2d
456, 460 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (emphasis added).
261. 75 Misc. 2d 570 348 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
262. Id. at 571, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 502 (emphasis added).
263. "We are living in times of the gravest national tension, when aggressive
Soviet Communist imperialism may launch an attack on the free world at any point
at any time." Governor's Memorandum, reprinted in 1951 New York State Legisla-
tive Annual 323, 324.
264. See generally N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 9102 (McKinney 1974).
265. Sikora v. Keilor, 17 A.D.2d 6 (2d Dep't 1962). In Sikora, a plaintiff sued for
personal injuries resulting from an accident allegedly caused by a volunteer fireman
during the performance of his duties. Id. at 7. Under the New York statute, the
volunteer fireman enjoyed immunity except for wilful negligence or malfeasance.
Id., citing N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 205-b (McKinney 1974). Moreover, the statute
expressly left municipal liability intact. Id. The court described "the underlying
purpose of the statutory exemption . . .[as] encourag[ing] and facilitat[ing] volun-
teer firemen's service. Id.
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employs the groups on a regular basis to perform police functions
outside the legislative intent behind the Defense Emergency Act, it
should not be granted such an immunity.
III. Conclusion
A plaintiff injured by an anticrime volunteer effectively has no
remedy under federal law-whether under section 1983 or the Consti-
tution. Scant basis exists for municipal liability Under section 1983
because of Monell's rejection of respondeat superior and the require-
ment that an official policy caused the constitutional deprivation.
While the required showings could be made by proof of official inac-
tion in the face of a pattern of unlawful conduct or by concerted
action between police and private individuals, merely negligent inac-
tion would not suffice. The rejection of respondeat superior and the
questionable applicability of Bivens to non-federal defendants also
may foreclose the remedy afforded directly under the Constitution.
Most importantly, courts view section 1983 as an "equally effective"
remedy, thereby barring constitutional actions.
Under state law in jurisdictions permitting suits against municipali-
ties, a plaintiff may succeed under a theory of respondeat superior
only if he can prove a master-servant relationship between the city
and the volunteers. The elements of control and consent, essential to
the doctrine, however, are absent in the relationships between most
anticrime volunteer groups and municipalities. Although an injured
plaintiff thus may be left without a remedy against a municipality
which has derived significant benefit from the police and patrol func-
tions assumed by volunteers, relegating the entire burden of liability to
a party performing valuable work eventually may discourage such
anticrime activity to the detriment of the public. Therefore, anticrime
volunteer groups should be granted immunity in order to foster and
encourage this activity in view of rising crime and diminishing police
forces, and municipalities should shoulder the financial responsibility
for providing sufficient police-type protection.
Henry C. Collins
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